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COMMENT & DISCUSSION 
(Continued from page 9) 
step with the mission of offering new in-
sights that-while perhaps not likely to 
be fully endorsed by our leaders-should 
certainly give them pause for reflection. 
-CAPT Mark Stange, USNR (Ret.) 
AUTOMATION Will CHANGE 
SEA POWER 
(See J. Arquilla and P. Denning, pp. 32-36, 
June2019) 
THE NAVY NEEDS Al: IT'S JUST 
NOT CERTAIN WHY 
(See G. Galdorisi, pp. 28-32, May 2019) 
PROFESSORS ARQUILLA AND 
DENNING emphasize the need for vig-
orous, swift adoption of nrtificial intelli-
gence. In chapter 12 of Fleet Tactics and 
Naval Operatio11s, (3rd ed., Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2018) Rear Admiral Bob Gir-
rier and I complement their observations, 
but from the operator's point of view. 
We agree with their conclusion that 
Al's greatest value ensues from hu-
man-machine collaboration. The best 
chess and Go competitors tum out to be 
highly skilled humans teamed with "well-
trained" Al programs. Together, they gen-
erally beat either expert humans or artifi-
cial intelligence programs acting alone. 
Modem technology can make a ro-
botic tank, but the Al program cannot 
anticipate everything. An experienced 
operator in the tank can respond to sur-
prises and will probably beat either a 
tank that relies solely on the swift action 
Al provides or a tank manned by hu-
man operators the old-fashioned way. In 
addition, questions still exist regarding 
neural network reliability and fragility 
for military applications. 
Captain Galdorisi seems unaware of 
the successes achieved in two research 
centers and several academic depart-
ments at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). NPS has developed and deployed 
increasingly robotic unmanned aerial 
systems and is deeply invested in big-
data applications and machine learning. 
Nevertheless, I want to emphasize the 
need first to establish the ends to which 
automated systems will be applied by the 
Navy-Marine Corps team, specifically 
for sea control, sea denial, or power pro-
jection, and tailored to different geogra-
phies and specific enemies. AI systems 
can then be developed to play a variety 
of roles in support of the strategic ends. 
Our new president, retired Vice Admi-
ral Ann Rondeau, has emphasized "dig-
ital competency" in recruiting and train-
ing for naval operations. She implies the 
need for fast action and immediate appli-
cation. NPS educates junior officers for 
information warfare and artificial intelli-
gence so they will graduate with the flex-
ibility of mind to anticipate the future as a 
competition. 
Arquilla and Denning emphasize 
swann attacks; aerial swarms are already 
being deployed, and unmanned undersea 
and surface systems arc on the way. 
I urge Proceedings readers to attend to 
the Arquilla-Denning essay, especially for 
the developers' point of view, including 
swift exploitation of what is happening 
now in the commercial world of computer 
and cyber technology. But readers should 
also reflect on the best ways to exploit Al, 
including the future of swarms and count• 
er-swanns of relatively inexpensive un-
manned systems for combat operations. 
-CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.), 
Dean Emeritus, Naval Postgraduate School 
ORGANIZE COMBAT ~ 
LOGISTICS FOR THE 
HIGH-END FIGHT 
(See P. Pagano, pp. 40· 43, May 201.9) 
THERE IS A HISTORICAL ANALOGY to 
today's shortage of replenishment ships 
assigned to the Combat Logistics Force. 
In the mid-I 930s the Navy faced the 
same fundin~ problems we have today as 
it attempted to rebuild the fleet. Although 
the CNO at the time was concerned about 
the Navy's need for auxiliaries, the Gen-
eral Board (an advisory body reporting to 
the Secretary of the Navy) recommended 
against building any new auxiliaries, fear-
ing the funds for such ships would be di-
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verted from the construction of com-
batants. Fortunately for the Navy, an 
important figure within the U.S. Mari-
time Commission-Rear Admiral Emory 
S. Land, USN (Ret.), the fonner head of 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair--
convinced Congress to subsidize the con-
struction of commercial tankers hav-
ing National Defense Features: increased 
speed (to keep up with the fleet), gun 
foundations, and magazine spaces. This 
resulted in the construction often Cimar-
nm-class oilers initially built for the Stan-
dard Oil Company of New Jersey. 
These fleet oilers proved a godsend 
for the Navy. They were acquired by 
the Navy just before the start of hostili-
ties and quickly converted for naval use. 
Without the availability of these fast 
tankers-they accompanied every ma-
jor carrier task force operation in the first 
six months of the war-it is unlikely that 
the U.S. carriers would have been able to 
conduct the wide-ranging raids that ulti-
mately led to the defeat of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy at Midway. 
One would hope that the shortage of 
high-end logistic support ships identified 
by Captain Pagano is corrected before 
the Navy finds itself ill-equipped to fight 
a major sea war far from U.S. shores. 
-Thomas WIidenberg 
DIVISION OFFICERS CAN 
LEARN FROM CAPTAIN 
AUBREY 
(See B. Cordial, pp, 152-54, May 2019) 
I ENTHUSIASTICALLY SECOND and 
support Lieutenant Cordial's reflection on 
"Lucky Jack" Aubrey's leadership skills. 
Aubrey's ability to lead and inspire his 
crew was heavily influenced by his time 
before the mast. In events only described 
in retrospect, he was disrated for cause 
from an unruly midshipman to a common 
sailor, spending six months as a seaman 
before being reappointed midshipman. 
Aubrey manages many incidents based on 
an understanding, formed during that pe-
riod, of how his crew lived, slept, ate, and 
survived both in combat and in the normal 
daily routine of onboard life. 
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